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A key concern in any discussion about privatization is the benefits that might accrue to
society from public firms. Their advocates claim that they can be used as economic policy
instruments. In mixed oligopoly markets (i.e., markets in which private and public firms
compete), some economists and policy-makers argue that public enterprises are able to
mitigate market power through more competitive pricing, or what I shall refer to here
as “regulatory intervention”.1
The mixed oligopoly literature has analyzed the strategic interaction between public
and private firms in non-perfect competitive markets in order to establish, in theory, the
welfare e↵ects of privatization. Several studies employing such models have concluded
that full privatization is inadvisable because it can have counter-competitive e↵ects on
the market and lead to subsequent increases in terms of deadweight loss (De Fraja and
Delbono, 1989; Matsumura, 1998). These conclusions arise from the assumption that
the objective function of public and mixed firms di↵ers from that of private firms. In
most cases, mixed oligopoly models assume that private firms aim to maximize profits
while the objective function of public (or mixed) firms is to promote social welfare.2
Public firms may have objectives other than profit maximization and may even have a
multiplicity of objectives (Kay and Thompson, 1986).3 In the field, the objective function
of this type of firm depends on several issues related to the government’s ultimate goal
and the incentives provided to their managers (Fershtman and Judd, 1987) and it is thus
not possible to know a priori what the objective function of a public firm is.4
1In this paper, public firms are defined as those in which national or local governments have a
majority shareholding and control their management.
2Traditional approaches to public firms have mainly viewed them as instruments of government
policy and planning (Bös, 2015). Following this approach, the mixed oligopoly model assumes that the
objective functions of public firms is to promote social welfare.
3According to Kay and Thompson (1986), “Public sector managers could be expected to respond to
the particular personal incentives with which they were faced. Such incentives might lead to a desire to
maximise the scale of operations of the business, subject to any external financial constraint, or to seek
a quiet life untroubled by changes in working practices or di culties in labour relations, rather than to
pursue a nebulous public good.”
4For instance, if there is political pressure from voters to decrease prices, public firms may try
to mitigate market power, even applying predatory prices. Conversely, if a government is seeking to
redress a fiscal deficit, its state-owned firms may try to maximize profits using market power markups
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Given this ambiguity, and its obvious importance in determining the e↵ect of private
and state ownership on competition, the behavioral di↵erence between public and private
firms is a matter that merits empirical analysis.
The possibility of conducting such analyses in regulated industries has been greatly
enhanced over the last three decades thanks to the improved availability of data and a
diversity of market reforms. As a result of these two developments, it is now possible to
empirically address the key question underpinning the mixed oligopoly model, namely:
Do public and private firms behave the same when faced with equivalent incentives? An
empirical analysis of di↵erences in the way in which private and public firms exercise
their market power should provide interesting insights.
In this paper, I address the strategic pricing of public and private firms from an empir-
ical perspective in order to determine how they exercise their market power. Specifically,
I extend the analysis of the incentive to exercise market power (IEMP), as proposed by
McRae and Wolak (2009), to the case of two di↵erent types of firm showing disparate be-
havior in response to the same strategic incentives. This technique draws on information
about individual bids (willingness to sell) available in the electricity markets organized as
a multi-product auction. I apply this extended methodology to the Colombian wholesale
electricity market.
The case of the Colombian electricity market is appealing because market power
and marked rises in wholesale electricity prices are a major concern for the Colombian
authorities, consumers, and stakeholders alike. Leading industrial consumers tend to
be well organized and lobby the government for energy cost reductions. At the same
time, the Ministry of Energy and Mines sits on the board of several of the leading public
electricity generation companies. As a result, there are potential incentives for public
and mixed firms under government control to exert market power mitigation.5
as a covert form of taxation. Likewise, governments committed to a privatization program will boost a
public firm’s profit performance in order to increase the sale price. In addition, in the particular case of
mixed firms with a government majority share, the board members have a fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholders and therefore cannot ignore profit-maximization incentives. I owe this observations to an
anonymous referee.
5It is important to clarify that, in relation to the objective function of public companies in the
Colombian wholesale electricity market, in this document I try to establish how close their price responses
2
Besides its relationship to mixed oligopoly models, this paper also lies at the inter-
section of two other di↵erent strands in the literature: i) Empirical studies comparing
the e ciency of public and private firms, and ii) studies estimating market power in
electricity markets.
To date, empirical studies of the e ciency of public and private firms have focused pri-
marily on di↵erences in the performance (or productive e ciency) of public and private
monopolies (Bel et al., 2010; Frydman et al., 1999; La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes, 1999;
Netter and Megginson, 2001). One relevant exception is the study by Seim and Waldfo-
gel (2013) which was specifically aimed at determining the goals implicit in the decisions
of public enterprises. Seim and Waldfogel (2013) estimated a spatial model of demand
based on information about Pennsylvania’s state liquor retailing monopoly and found
that the store network is very similar in size and configuration to the welfare-maximizing
configuration. My research is similarly focused on disentangling the di↵erences between
the goals of public and private firms, but it di↵ers from their study in that I analyze a
situation in which private and public companies compete in the same electricity market,
whereas Seim and Waldfogel (2013) investigated the goals of a public monopoly. To the
best of my knowledge, the only paper to focus on the di↵erences between public and
private firms competing in the same market is that by Barros and Modesto (1999), on
the Portuguese banking sector.
The economic literature examining the problem of market power in electricity gen-
eration markets is extensive. However, three main groups of empirical models can be
identified according to the methodological approach employed. The first of these is based
on the direct or indirect estimate of Lerner indexes or markups (Wolak, 2003; Wolfram,
1999). The second group of studies seeks to determine the agents’ market power, simulat-
ing the equilibrium conditions that emerge from economic models of oligopoly (Bushnell
et al., 2008; Green and Newbery, 1992; Hortacsu and Puller, 2008; Sweeting, 2007; Wolak,
are to the theoretical behavioral benchmarks proposed by the mixed oligopoly models. Rather than
evaluating whether public companies deploy a welfare-maximizing strategy, I evaluate whether or not
public companies ignore their incentives to exercise market power. Although ignoring such incentives
is consistent with welfare maximization, there are other plausible theoretical benchmarks that could
explain this behavior.
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2000). The third approach involves the use of structural econometric models to estimate
functional or behavioral parameters (Reguant, 2014; Wolak, 2007; Wolfram, 1998).
Although several techniques have been proposed for estimating market power in elec-
tricity markets, few studies have attempted to distinguish di↵erences in competitive
behavior between heterogeneous types of firm. In this respect, my approach is related
to the studies by Hortacsu and Puller (2008) and Hortaçsu et al. (2019), who examined
the bidding behavior of firms in the Texas electricity spot market and found di↵erences
in the competitive strategies of large and small firms. Concerning the methodological
approach, as mentioned above, my empirical implementation is similar to the estimation
model proposed by McRae and Wolak (2009).
The main contribution of this paper is the development of an empirical model to
analyze di↵erences between private and public firms in terms of their incentives to ex-
ercise market power in a multi-unit auction framework. This methodology provides a
new analytical tool that serves to clarify the e↵ect of mixed (private-state) ownership
on competition. Overall, this methodology is applicable to any multi-unit, uniform price
auction in which the competitors’ bids and marginal costs are observable.
The empirical analysis performed here suggests that there are marked di↵erences in
the way private and public firms exercise their unilateral market power, supporting the
hypothesis of the latter’s market power mitigation. The results indicate that public firms
do not price strategically in the spot market. Moreover, partial evidence was found to
suggest profit-maximization behavior on the part of private firms and of bidding under
the marginal cost pricing rule on the part of public firms. These findings are consistent
with the behavioral structure of mixed oligopoly models.
The rest of this paper is divided into five sections. Section two outlines the char-
acteristics of the Colombian wholesale electricity market and the structural problems
it presents that must be taken into account to accurately identify the behavioral pa-
rameters under study. Section three explains the theory underpinning the incentives for
profit-maximizing firms to exercise unilateral market power and stresses the di↵erences
in this regard with the behavior of firms that do not act strategically. This section also
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describes the empirical approach adopted to identify the behavioral di↵erences between
private and public firms. Section four presents the data and the results of applying
the proposed empirical approach to this market and reports several robustness checks
on multiple econometric choices. The final section summarizes the results and presents
some conclusions.
2 The Colombian market and mixed competition
This section outlines the principal features of the Colombian electricity generation market
that distinguish it as a mixed oligopoly and describes the main elements of this market
that must be taken into account when examining problems of market power.
For a market to be considered a mixed oligopoly, it must satisfy three conditions: i)
the market must be liberalized, i.e. the price is determined by the competing bids made
by the producers; ii) public, private and mixed firms must compete in equal conditions,
i.e. there are no discrimination rules; and iii) the conditions of competition in the market
are not perfect, i.e. there are high levels of concentration.
As regards the first condition, since the introduction of the Public Utilities Act (Act
142 of 1994) and the Electricity Act (Act 143 of 1994), electricity generation in Colombia
has been organized as a pooled wholesale electricity market. Generators can sell their
energy by means of long-term bilateral contracts with other agents or directly in the
day-ahead power exchange. This exchange operates as a multi-unit, uniform first-price
auction, in which each generator reports a price bid (or willingness to sell) to the market
operator for each generation unit. With this information, and according to demand fore-
casts, the market operator organizes the generation units from the cheapest to the most
expensive (this arrangement is known as merit order) and defines the market clearing
price (spot price) for every hour of the day. This feature demonstrates that the Colom-
bian wholesale energy market is neither price-regulated nor a cost-based pool and that
it obeys the conditions of competition among producers.
Second, with respect to the coexistence of private and public companies in the Colom-
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bian generation market, it should be noted that although the intention of the Colombian
electricity sector reform in the early nineties was to promote private entrepreneurship,
the activity has a high proportion of public or mixed firms under government control. It
is also important to clarify that classification of generation firms into “private” and “pub-
lic” categories in the Colombian electricity market is not direct because there are several
firms with both private and public participation. In addition, smaller publicly-owned
firms had power purchase agreements (PPAs) to buy electricity from privately-owned
generation plants. For the particular application reported here, this classification was
performed by unit, taking into account the category of shareholder controlling the firm
that represents the unit to the market operator.6
Table 1 shows market shares in the Colombian wholesale electricity market for 2014.
The second column reveals that four of the seven leading firms were state controlled in
that year according to the classification criterion adopted in this study. In consonance
with this information, the leading generation firms operating in Colombia during the
study period presented a heterogeneous ownership structure in terms of the private or
public nature of their major shareholders.
Table 1: Market shares in the Colombian electricity market - 2014
Firm Majority Shareholding Electricity Generation (gWh) % Cumulative %
EMGESA Private 13691 21% 21%
EPM Public 13626 21% 42%
ISAGEN Public 10609 16% 59%
GECELCA Public 7508 12% 71%
COLINV. Private 6711 10% 81%
AES Private 3982 6% 87%
GENSA Public 2436 4% 91%
Others 5764 9% 100%
Total 64328 100% 100%
HH 1422
Source: XM - Market Operator
6It is important to consider that the entity responsible for the bidding process of a generation unit in
the Colombian wholesale electricity market is the firm that represents the unit to the market operator.
Table D22 in appendix D presents the ownership features of the most important firms in the Colombian
electricity generation market and table D23 in appendix D lists the generator units used in the analysis
and details the corresponding ownership group and classification into public or private.
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Finally, as regards the third condition, i.e., the level of market competition and
concentration, electricity generation activity in Colombia shows levels of concentration
that correspond to a moderate oligopoly, according to the merger guidelines of the US
Department of Justice. Table 1 presents the participation of the six leading generation
companies in the Colombian generation market.
In addition to the above features, there are several other features of the Colombian
wholesale electricity market that must be considered in order to accurately characterize
the unilateral market power of electricity generators.
i Colombia’s generation supply is mainly produced by hydroelectric and thermoelectric
resources. In the case of the country’s hydro technology, it should be borne in mind
that Colombia’s rain regime is subject to the e↵ects of El Niño and La Niña events.
During the former, dry weather conditions have a negative impact on the contribu-
tion of hydroelectric resources, while the opposite occurs during La Niña events. In
addition, the annual rain regime fluctuates between a dry season (December, Jan-
uary, and February) and a wet one (April, May, and June). Daily information is
available on the river flows that feed the main hydro units. As for the country’s
thermal technology units, these are primarily gas and coal fired. The gas market in
Colombia is organized as a bilateral contract scheme, and the price of Colombia’s
main gas well was regulated during the study period. Likewise, the fees for using
the gas transport pipes are regulated according to a mixed scheme which takes into
consideration capacities and volumes alike. Information is available about the heat
rates of each thermoelectric plant. Table 2 highlights the importance of large hydro
plants and thermoelectric units.
ii Most energy transactions are performed through long-term, fixed-price forward con-
tracts. Since physical dispatch is centrally coordinated, bilateral forward contracts
work as financial hedges against spot prices (Garcia and Arbelaez, 2002). Generally,
information on transactions made through bilateral forward contracts is not available
in markets that are organized as a multi-product auction. An additional advantage
7
Table 2: Generation by type of resource - 2013 and 2014
Generation (gWh)
Type December 2013 December 2014 Growth Share 2014
Hydro 3622 3707 2% 68 %
Thermal 1370 1474 8% 26 %
Small Units 300 305 2% 6%
Cogeneration 32 45 41% 1%
Total 5323 5531 4% 100%
Source: XM - Market Operator
of analyzing the case of the Colombian electricity market is that the information on
sales in long-term forward contracts is available after the market closes. Thus, the
net forward market position of the firms can be computed. Table 3 shows the total
energy traded in 2013 and 2014 in the electricity generation market, distinguish-
ing between transactions conducted through fixed-price forward contracts and direct
transactions in the day-ahead energy exchange.
Table 3: Energy sales by trade mechanism - 2013 and 2014
Generation (gWh)
2013 2014 Growth Share 2014
Spot Market 14949 15507 4% 18%
Forward Contracts 71374 69846 -2% 82%
Total 86323 85352 -1% 100%
Source: XM - Market Operator
iii Finally, the rules of the Colombian electricity exchange market allow only one valid
bid price to be made per unit for each 24-hour period. For each unit participating
in the central dispatch, the bid consists of one bid price that remains valid for the
entire day and 24 quantities (commercial availability), one for each hour of the day.
The generators report these day-ahead bids in the market clearing period. Regard-
less of the fact that the market clears every hour (in order to account for di↵erences
in demand and in availability of non-centrally dispatched generation resources), the
generator can only bid one price and cannot change any part of its bid during the cor-
responding 24-hour period. This restriction has considerable implications as regards
incentives to exercise market power, as will be explained in detail in sub-section 3.1.
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3 Theoretical background and identification
3.1 The incentives to exercise market power
This sub-section examines the theoretical background to an analysis of the IEMP of
profit-maximizing and non-strategic firms and the implications of certain features of
the Colombian wholesale electricity market regarding the identification approach. The
electricity market literature contains various empirical techniques for estimating market
power (Borenstein et al., 2002; Bushnell et al., 2008; Green and Newbery, 1992; Hortacsu
and Puller, 2008; Reguant, 2014; Wolak, 2003; Wolfram, 1998, 1999). A common element
in the most relevant papers conducting analyses of this type is that the estimation
strategy is based on the first order condition of the profit maximization problem. In
general, these order conditions make it possible to express the optimal price or bid as the
sum of a cost component plus a strategic component. Here, I adopt the model proposed
by Wolak (2000) and McRae and Wolak (2009). who have developed a methodology
for estimating the IEMP based on a simple model of profit-maximizing firms that have
ex-ante forward contract obligations in a residual demand setting. In this context, the
IEMP is the ability to change the spot price when withdrawing output with the aim
of maximizing profits. In a theoretical study, Allaz and Vila (1993) showed that when
profit-maximizing firms sell a large share of their output via forward contracts with fixed
prices, they have less incentive to increase prices on the spot markets.
According to McRae and Wolak (2009) model, assuming the generator has previously
sold an amount of energy qc
ih
at a fixed price P c
ih
by forward contracts, the profit function
of the generation firm i in the hour h can be defined by the following expression:
⇡ih = Ph(DRih)(DRih   q
c
ih






where ⇡ih represents the profits of firm i in hour h in the electricity market, Ph is
the spot price, DRih is the residual demand of firm i in hour h, and Ci(DRih) is the
















It should be borne in mind that at the point of market equilibrium, the residual
demand of firm i in hour h, DRih, is equal to the total quantity produced by that firm
in that hour, therefore @Ci(DRih)
@DRih
is the marginal cost of firm i in hour h. This is the first
term of the right-hand side of equation 1; the second is the strategic element, i.e., its
IEMP, which is equal to the interaction of the inverse of the slope of the residual demand
curve and the firm’s net position in the forward contracts market. This interaction is
the optimal margin of a profit-maximizing firm. Thus, the more energy sold by the firm
through fixed-price forward contracts, the less the incentive to increase the spot price.
Note, however, that in cases in which the generator has an energy deficit relative to its
contractual commitments, it has the IEMP by reducing, as opposed to incrementing, the
spot price (McRae and Wolak, 2009).
Given the design of the Colombian wholesale electricity market, the daily bid con-
straint limits the generator’s ability to make the precise bid that will maximize its profit
function each hour. The generation firm must choose a single price in order to maxi-
mize its expected daily profits. This means it cannot bid a continuous supply function
that intersects the maximum profit points, given the di↵erent realizations of the residual
demand. Thus, hourly IEMPs are not necessarily the same as daily incentives.
To address this problem, I propose a daily measurement of the IEMP. This measure















where sijt is the daily bid price on day t for the energy of unit j, the asterisk highlights
7See appendix A for a derivation.
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that this bid is optimal, cijt is the constant marginal cost of unit j, Hijt is defined as the
set of hours of day t where unit j is marginal, DRith is the residual demand of firm i
that owns unit j on day t at hour h and qc
ih
is the energy previously sold at a fixed price
by firm i on day t. The second term on the right-hand side of equation 2 is a weighted
version of the inverse semi-elasticity of the residual demand. This is the IEMP of a firm
that maximizes daily expected profits. I compute the daily IEMP of the firms for the
daily model according to this expression.
From a behavioral perspective, strategic firms will take the IEMP into account in
their pricing, whereas non-strategic firms will not. However, what type of behavior can
be expected from public firms seeking to mitigate market power? Here, the theoretical
literature on mixed oligopolies o↵ers an appealing response. Beato and Mas-Colell (1984)
have demonstrated that public firms are able to restore market e ciency by applying
the marginal cost pricing rule in a mixed oligopoly model in which public firms compete
with private firms, where the former are welfare maximizing and the latter are profit
maximizing. Hence, if public firms are implementing market power mitigation schemes,
we would expect them to apply the marginal cost pricing rule, or we would at least
expect the impact of the strategic element in prices to be less important for public than
for private firms.
What, therefore, are our expectations regarding public firms in the specific case of
Colombia? As stated in the introduction, there are potential incentives in Colombia
for public and mixed firms under government control to exert market power mitigation,
given the government’s direct participation on the board of several of these companies
and the capacity of interest groups to lobby for a reduction in electricity prices.
In sum, when private firms behave strategically, the interaction between the residual
demand slope and the net financial position has an impact on price bids. In contrast,
public firms have no IEMP, i.e., their prices are una↵ected by this interaction and are
primarily explained by the marginal cost.
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3.2 Identification strategy and estimation
In this section, the di↵erences in the incentives for private and public firms to exercise
market power are addressed from an empirical perspective. The model presented here
adopts the estimation methodology proposed by McRae and Wolak (2009), but includes
the interaction between the firms’ type of ownership and their IEMP. The extension of
this model to establish these di↵erences in incentives is based on expression 2 for private
companies.
It is important to consider that my intention is to determine whether public and
private companies respond in the same way to incentives to exercise market power, and
therefore I require a strategy to test whether the supply functions of the di↵erent types
of company respond in di↵erent ways to changes in the inverse semi-elasticity of residual
demand. Note that the expression 2 can be interpreted as a behavioral supply function
of a profit-maximizing firm, while the marginal cost pricing rule can be interpreted as a
behavioral supply function of a firm that ignores its incentives to exercise market power.
Therefore, I assume that the behavioral supply of private and public companies is




= ✓cijt + ↵k ⇤ \IEMPijtk + ⌘ijtk (3)
Where ✓ is the passtthrough of marginal costs, cijt represents the marginal costs, ↵k
is the response to incentives to exercise market power of company i that owns unit j at
time t and which is of the nature k, k 2 {public, private}, \IEMPijtk is the estimate of
the incentives to exercise market power and finally ⌘ijtk is a measurement error in the
estimates of the incentives to exercise market power of firm i 8.
Note that the equation 2 is an equilibrium condition, therefore it is only valid for the
firm’s marginal bid. This implies that although all price bids can be observed in each
auction, those that are out of equilibrium do not necessarily fulfill the expression 2. Given
8Reguant (2014) notes the potential endogeneity and measurement error of the elastic strategic
component( markup term) in the empirical analog of the first-order condition of a profit-maximizing
firm.
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the restrictions on the bidding program in the Colombian market described in section 2,
it is expected that the points of the bidding program outside a firm’s equilibrium will
show deviations from the optimality condition described by the expression 2. Each firms’
equilibrium quantities and bids arise from the interaction between the behavioral supply
function and the residual demand function; therefore, estimation of the parameter ↵k
implies a ”reverse causality” problem9.
In order to address this issue, it is necessary to adopt a simultaneous equations
approach and instrumentalize the IEMP. According to the interpretation of McRae and
Wolak (2009) the IEMP is equivalent to the inverse semi-elasticity of net residual demand
(After considering the previous forward contract obligations).
As regards the stochastic components of the residual demand, these can be generated
by demand shocks or by shifts in the competitors’ supply function. Consequently, I
will model the incentive to exercise market power (IEMP) as the sum of these two
components.
\IEMPijtk = ⌫th +   ith (4)
It is reasonable to assume that the shocks of demand ⌫th come from expected and
unexpected consumer reactions which lie completely beyond the firms’ control. These
reactions may be a response to price changes (endogenous components) or to demand
driver changes (exogenous component)10. I will model the demand shocks as the sum of
expected changes to demand drivers,11 an elastic component which is clearly endogenous
and unexpected shocks which could be exogenous or endogenous.
9Note that the IEMP results from the expectations that various firms have about their rivals’ be-
havior. According to the bid rules of the wholesale energy market, the competitors’ bids must be made
simultaneously. Thus, for generator A to estimate its residual demand curve, it has to form an expecta-
tion about its rivals’ bid prices; however, at the same time, the bid prices of these rival firms will depend
on their estimates of the residual demand curves, which in turn will be dependent on their expectations
regarding generator A’s bid prices.
10The fact that consumers’ reactions to demand driver changes are beyond the firms’ control suggests
independence of these variables, rendering them candidates for suitable instruments.
11The demand drivers are external shocks that shift but do not rotate the inverse function of residual
demand
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⌫th = ⇡1zth + ⇠th(pth) +  th (5)
Where ⇡1z1 represents the expected changes in demand drivers ⇠th(pt) represents
endogenous reaction to prices (elastic component) and  th is the sum of unexpected
demand shocks.
With regard to shocks in the competitors’ supply function,   ith. These shifts may
be caused by foreseen changes in the costs of rival firms or by unforeseen impacts on
their strategic incentives (elastic component). Clearly, because this second component
depends on the strategic interaction of competing firms, poses a problem of endogeneity.
I will model the shocks in the competitors’ supply function as the sum of changes in rival
firms’ cost shifters ⇡2z2
 ith
and the endogenous (and elastic) component ! ith(pt).
  ith = ⇡2z2 ith + ! ith(pth) (6)
Hence, plugging expressions (5) and (6) in expression (4), the IEMP can be expressed
as:
\IEMPijtk = ⇡1z1th + ⇡2z2 ith + ⇠th(pt) + ! ith(pt) +  th (7)
I address the endogeneity problem here by performing estimates that consider instru-
ments for the IEMP whose variation arises either from expected demand shocks z1th or
exclusively from the competitors’ cost component z2 ith (both of which are uncorrelalated
to the measurement error of the IEMP).
The literature on market power estimation in an environment of di↵erentiated prod-
ucts recommends using the observed characteristics of the products supplied by rival
firms in order to obtain the optimal instruments for a specific product (Berry et al.,
1995). By analogy, in the context of the electricity market, the instruments I have se-
lected are variables that are uncorrelated to the rivals’ elastic component but which at
the same time have e↵ects on their supply function, that is, factors associated with shifts
14
in the costs of rival firms 12 .
Specifically, I consider three instruments:
i A weekend day dummy variable is used in order to capture expected demand shocks;
this instrument is valid because it reasonable to assume that the weekday condition is
independent of the measurement error. Likewise, the only channel through which the
day of the week can a↵ect the supply of firm i is through a shift in the residual demand
curve. The cost shifters of electricity generation depend mainly on the technological
characteristics of the units and the cost of fuels. Generally, generating companies sign
long-term contracts for the supply of fuel, which do not include substantial changes
in the price of the same depending on the day of the week. The above suggests that
this instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction.
ii The inflows of the rivers feeding the rivals’ main hydraulic generation units are used
to account for changes in the marginal costs of the leading competitors. The indepen-
dent nature of this variable is evident given its dependency on natural phenomena.
Regarding the exclusion restriction, it is not expected that the inflows of the rivers
feeding the reservoirs of competitors have an impact on the opportunity cost of fuel
usage of the units of the firms owned by the firm i. Hence, shifts in residual demand
constitute the only pathway through which competitors’ river inflows can impact the
behavioral supply function.
iii The competitors’ full commercial availability, i.e., their total generation capacity on
specific days. It is important to clarify that in the Colombian wholesale electricity
market, commercial availability is the quantity component of the daily bid. Firms
can report only one commercial availability per unit for each hour. This availability
is taken into account by the regulator in order to calculate the historical unavailabil-
ity index due to forced fails. This indicator considers the observed unavailability of
each generation asset, and higher levels trigger a reduction in revenue from the gen-
12As instruments I use several rivals’ cost shifters which are equivalent to drivers of the residual
demand of firm i
15
eration back-up scheme under Colombian law (reliability charge). Thus, generation
companies do not have incentives to systematically make strategic use of commercial
availability. The greatest changes in this last variable are motivated by the scheduled
or unscheduled unavailability of the plants and by the highly variable contribution of
smaller base-load generation units. The short-term decisions of firm i do not have an
e↵ect on its competitors’ sources of variation and therefore, this variable can be con-
sidered independent. Likewise, the short-term contingencies or planned maintenance
intervention of rivals’ generation assets a↵ect neither the generation technology nor
the opportunity cost of fuel usage by the units owned by firm i. Hence, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the rivals’ commercial availability only a↵ects the behavioral
supply function through shifts in the residual demand.
Finally, in order to perform an estimation of the econometric model posed in ex-
pression (8), it is necessary to model the marginal cost component cijt. Marginal cost
estimates of the units can be obtained from engineering formulae and the technical char-
acteristics and prices of the observable inputs. However, there may be unit characteristics
and random shocks common to all plants that are not observable to the econometrician
and which have an e↵ect on marginal costs. In addition, it is important to bear in mind
that the computations performed to obtain the marginal cost estimate may contain a
measurement error given that fuel costs are approximated to reference prices, and the
cost per unit in actual fuel supply contracts may be di↵erent. Therefore, in this pa-
per it is assumed that the marginal costs of each unit can be expressed as the sum of
the marginal cost estimate based on the technical parameters of the unit, an individual
heterogeneity component and time e↵ect common to all the units, and an exogenous
disturbance term, i.e. cjt = bcjt + µj + 't + ⇣jt.




=  0 + ✓(bcijt) + ↵pri(Dprij ⇤ \IEMPijt) + ↵pub(D
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is the bid of firm i, for its marginal unit j on day t, ccijt is the estimate of the
marginal cost of unit j on day t, \IEMPijt is the estimation of the incentive to exercise
market power for a profit- maximizing firm (the empirical estimate of the second term of
the left-hand side of expression [2], for company i on day t for the hours in which unit j
was marginal, andDpub
j
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when unit j is owned
by a firm i under state control and 0 otherwise. Dpri
j
is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 when unit j is owned by a private firm i and 0 otherwise. µj and 't represent
unobserved unit and time e↵ects, respectively. The term of disturbance "it contains the
unobservable exogenous disturbance term of the marginal cost and the sum of hourly
measurement errors of the IEMP, i.e., "it = ⇣jt + ⌘ijtk where ⌘ijtk =
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h=1 ⌘ijthk.  0, ✓,
↵pub, ↵pri are the parameters to be estimated. This model is similar to the application
developed by McRae and Wolak (2009); however, in the present paper, heterogeneous
e↵ects are introduced for public and private companies.
It should be borne in mind that Pijt is the price-bid of unit j when the latter is
marginal. The first order condition expressed in equation 2 is not valid when unit j is
not marginal. This means that the panel data only contain information about those
plants that were marginal for at least one hour in the day. Likewise, in the case of the
residual demand approach, the marginal price bid of firm i is equal to the spot price,
that is, pth = s⇤imt, if unit m is marginal in hour h. However, given the discontinuity and
ladder shape of the supply and residual demand functions, this does not always occur in
the real market. Therefore, there are two alternatives regarding the dependent variable
of the model presented in expression 8: Either the spot price when unit i clears the
market or the price bid of the marginal unit of each firm. Since a greater number of
observations can be used with the latter alternative (and unit j does not need to clear
the market), it can be considered the most appropriate option.
In the framework of the instrumental variables approximation, I implement several
specifications of the two-way fixed e↵ects proposed in expression 8. Note that for private
companies, the inclusion of these fixed e↵ects terms would allow them to bid prices
above or below the marginal cost independent of residual demand and their contractual
17
position, that is, for reasons independent of their IEMP. As far as public companies are
concerned, the additional fixed e↵ects would allow level-shift deviation, which implies
violating the marginal cost pricing rule.13 As I mentioned above, I interpret these fixed
e↵ects as unobservable individual heterogeneity and unobservable time e↵ect common
to all the units of the marginal cost. I assume that the unobservable, time-variant









I propose estimating the parameters ↵pub and ↵pri by implementing a linear general-
ized method of moments (GMM) model with standard errors clustered by unit. Assuming
a valid and relevant set of instruments Zijt, I am able to exploit the orthogonality con-
ditions of the instruments and the first order condition of the daily profit maximization
problem presented in expression 2 in order to construct the moments conditions. The


















· \IEMPijt) ↵pub(Dpubj · \IEMPijt) µj 't
⇤i
= 0
The parameters can now be estimated using the empirical analogue of these moments
conditions.
Finally, it is important to consider that estimation of the opportunity costs of using
hydro power resources involves dynamic components that do not necessarily correspond
to the first order conditions given in expression 2. For this reason, the baseline estima-
tions presented in this paper only uses data from situations in which the firms’ marginal
power plants use thermal technology.14 However, the importance of hydroelectric gen-
13I owe this observation to an anonymous referee.
14Here, it is necessary to clarify that I do not include hydro units, not only because the opportunity
cost of water is di cult to estimate, but also because for hydro units, the first-order condition for this
type of unit could be di↵erent from the one presented in expression (2). In the robustness check section,
I present the results of the estimates including hydro units under the assumption of the same first-order
condition for the di↵erent types of generation technology. The qualitative and quantitative results are
similar to the baseline estimate.
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eration in the Colombian electricity market is useful to refine the identification strategy
in order to address endogeneity issues.
The econometric exercises proposed here seek empirical evidence for the impact of
private and public companies’ IEMP in their bid prices according to the predictions of
the mixed oligopoly model. Three specific hypotheses are analyzed:
i Hypothesis 1 (H1): Given the same incentives, the exercise of market power by
state-owned and private firms di↵ers.
ii Hypothesis 2 (H2): Public firms (do not) exercise market power as non-strategic
agents, i.e. they apply the marginal cost pricing rule.
iii Hypothesis 3 (H3): Private firms exercise market power taking into account the
strategic element.
First, note that testing the null hypothesis, ↵pri = ↵pub in expression 8 is consonant
with the rationale that the exercise of market power by state-owned and private firms is
equal given their incentives. If private firms behave as profit maximizers and public en-
terprises implement market power mitigation schemes, then depending on the ownership
of each enterprise, the interaction of residual demand slope and net forward contract
position will impact di↵erently on their respective bidding strategies.
In the case of the second hypothesis, if public firms do not behave strategically, we
would expect the parameter ↵pub not to be statistically di↵erent from zero, i.e. null
hypothesis ↵pub = 0. If public firms exercise regulatory intervention, then their prices
will be explained mainly by the marginal cost and they will not be a↵ected by the
interaction of the residual demand and the net financial position.
Finally, according to theory, if private companies behave strategically (profit maxi-
mizers), we would expect the parameter ↵pri to be statistically significant and to present
a positive sign (being very close to 1 in the case of profit-maximizing firms), i.e. null
hypothesis ↵pri > 0 (↵pri = 1 in the case of profit maximization). If private firms behave
strategically, their IEMP has an impact on the firms’ pricing. These tests are performed
for each of the parameters estimated in the econometric models described above.
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It is important to clarify that the interpretation of the coe cient ↵ is di↵erent from
the conduct parameter ✓ estimated in several applications of the new empirical industrial
organization (NEIO) literature. First, the conduct parameter ✓ is an estimate of the
price-cost mark up adjusted by the elasticity of total demand. As this is corrected for
total demand, its interpretation is linked to the entire market competition model and not
to individual firm behavior. In the case of the parameter ↵, this can also be interpreted
as a measure of the price-cost mark up but adjusted by the elasticity of residual demand
and the percentage of exposure to the spot price of each firm. This measure is relative
to the best response of each particular firm.15
Interpretation of ↵ when it takes the values 0 or 1 is clear: When ↵ is 1, the firm is
maximizing its profit unilaterally in the static game, and when ↵ is 0, the firm is ignor-
ing its incentives to exercise market power (and potentially applying the marginal cost
pricing rule). However, when ↵ takes di↵erent values, interpretation is less clear as it is
not associated with stylized competitive behavior (profit maximization or competition).
Deviations from stylized behavior values may be interpreted in the same way as in
Hortacsu and Puller (2008) and Hortaçsu et al. (2019), i.e., as deviations of optimization
behavior unrelated to strategic reasons. Alternatively, values of ↵ between 0 and 1 can
be interpreted as evidence that the firm is o↵ering prices as if it were facing a more elastic
residual demand than is the case, for strategic reasons. Mercadal (2019) posits that when
15The conduct parameter ✓ represents firms’ beliefs regarding how competitors will react to changes in
the firm’s quantity. Meanwhile, the parameter ↵ can be interpreted as a measure of the extent to which
a company adopts its best response strategy unilaterally given its own forward contracting and the bids
of its competitors. The parameter ↵ does not necessarily inform us about the underlying competition
model in the market (this parameter tells us nothing about the competitors’ best response); rather,
it indicates whether each firm’s unilateral response is consistent with unilateral profit maximization
in the static model. It is important to clarify that I go beyond calculating the inverse elasticity of
total demand using econometric methods. In this paper, the IEMP is in principle observed, and is
estimated using a non-parametric method which considers the actual residual demand and includes the
reaction of competitors to potential changes in the price bids of firm i. According to Corts (1999), if
each firm i anticipates that its rivals’ aggregate output is a function Ri(qi) and if R0i(qi) = ri, firm i ’s
first-order condition is P = c0i(qi)   (1 + ri)P
0(Q)qi, which is equivalent to (1) when ✓i = 1 + ri. In
terms of the notation used by Corts (1999), my regressor of interest, i.e., the IEMP, already includes the
direction of R0i(qi). Given that I can observe the inverse semi-elasticity of demand, it is not necessary to
conjecture about the competitive behavior of the competitors of firm i, because in the regression model,
the parameter ↵ is not the coe cient of  P 0(Q)qi, as in the case of the conduct parameter, but the
coe cient of  (1  ri)P 0(Q)qi.
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attempting to determine entry, generators do not play best response (in the static game),
but act as if they were facing a more elastic residual demand (This is ↵ < 0).16 On the
other hand, values of the parameter ↵ greater than 1 can be interpreted as evidence
that the firm is o↵ering prices as if it were facing a less elastic residual demand than it
actually does, for strategic reasons. Mercadal (2019) suggests that, in a repeated game
cooperative equilibrium, firms do not play best response, but instead behave as if they
were facing a less elastic residual demand than than they actually do (This is ↵ > 1).17
The section that follows describes the methodological procedure for computing the
model’s variables, including the IEMP and marginal costs. Finally, the econometric
method employed in the estimation is outlined and the most relevant results are pre-
sented.
4 Empirical Implementation
The hourly and daily data for 21 firms in the Colombian wholesale electricity market
were analyzed for the period 2005 to 2014. To test the three hypotheses (H1, H2, and
H3) by estimating the parameters ↵pub and ↵pri of the model proposed in expression 8,
we also need data on marginal costs and on the IEMP. Unfortunately, these variables
cannot be observed directly, so we have to rely on indirect estimations.
In the case of marginal costs, an accounting approach is adopted. This is similar to
16There may be several reasons for a firm to o↵er prices “as if it faced” a more elastic residual demand.
For example, the firm may fear regulatory intervention to reduce unilateral market exercise, so it does
not exercise its full market power when the resulting price increases could arouse excessive concern in
the authorities. Likewise, in the case of a public company seeking to balance consumer welfare and
profits, 1  ↵ could be interpreted as the importance that the firm gives to consumer welfare.
17Note that interpretations associated with entry deterrence, fear of regulatory intervention, and
cooperative equilibrium implicitly entail scenarios of dynamic strategic interaction, namely, a profit-
maximization model subject to an incentive compatibility constraint associated with future revenues.
If the incentive compatibility constraints are a function of simultaneous residual demand shocks, then
the estimated ↵ parameter may be subject to Corts (1999) criticism (i.e., ↵ may be biased). In any
event, according to the identification strategy suggested by Puller (2009), the inclusion of time fixed
e↵ects in my base line estimation allows me to address this potential inconsistent estimation issue.
According to Puller (2009), theoretically, the unobserved e↵ect related to the incentive compatibility
constraint “is equal across all firms in the collusive regime for a given period (i.e., it is not indexed by
i). Although, a researcher does not have data on it, this extra term can be ‘conditioned out’ by including
time fixed-e↵ects”.
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Figure 1: Estimated marginal costs
(a) Private units (b) Public units
Source: Data from XM - Calculations and elaboration: Author.
the one employed in previous studies in the field of electricity markets (Borenstein and
Bushnell, 1999; Borenstein et al., 2002; Fabra and Reguant, 2014; Green and Newbery,
1992; Wolak, 2000; Wolfram, 1998, 1999). The marginal costs of thermal plants are
computed, based on the technical parameters of the plants (heat rate), fuel costs, and
fuel transportation costs. The data sources and more detailed information concerning the
assumptions for the calculation and imputation of these costs are presented in appendix
B. It is important to bear in mind that these computations may contain a measurement
error given that I approximate fuel costs to reference prices, and the cost per unit in
actual fuel supply contracts may be di↵erent.
Daily marginal costs were calculated and imputed for 36 thermal plants belonging to
21 firms. Given the small di↵erences in heat rate between publicly owned and private
units, no significant di↵erences were found in the distribution of marginal costs between
public and private generation units. Panels (a) and (b) in figure 1 present the histograms
of the estimated marginal costs for private and public generation units, respectively.
As for the IEMP, recall that this incentive is related to the elasticity of residual
demand. Since the Colombian wholesale electricity market allows us to observe the price
bids and commercial availability of each plant as well as actual electricity demand, it is
possible to replicate the residual demand of each generator. The result of this exercise
is a decreasing step function of residual demand in which the partial derivative is zero
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or indeterminate (McRae and Wolak, 2009). Therefore, to calculate the inverse net
semi-elasticity of demand, an approximation must be made to the slope of this function
around the market equilibrium price. Wolak (2003) suggests a non-parametric method
for calculating the elasticity of residual demand using the points of the function with
prices closest to — both above and below — the market equilibrium price.
As stated above, a daily version of the IEMP was computed to account for the fact
that in the Colombian electricity market, generators maximize daily as opposed to hourly
profits (see sub-section 3.1). Adopting the methodology proposed by Wolak (2003), the
empirical version of the IEMP — i.e., the second term on the right-hand side of equation












|unit j is marginal in hour h)
(9)
where \IEMPijt is the incentive to exercise market power on day t for unit j that is
marginal for several hours of the day, pabove
th
(1 +  ) is the price of the next step in the
residual demand curve above the price pth ·(1+ ), pbelowth (1+ ) is the price of the previous
step in the residual demand curve below the price pth · (1   ), IGith is the actual ideal
generation of producer i in hour h and qc
ith
is the quantity of energy committed in fixed
price forward contracts.18 As stated in section 2, in the Colombian wholesale electricity
market this quantity is observable ex post. Finally, I assume a parameter   = 0.05 (5%).
Figure 2 illustrates this non-parametric calculation technique. Previous studies using
this methodology (McRae and Wolak, 2009; Wolak, 2000) suggest that changes in   do
not have a marked e↵ect on the outcomes. Later in this paper, in the robustness checks
section, I verify that the decision regarding the parameter   does not have a critical
impact on the results of the estimates. I present the estimates obtained by applying  
18From a supply function equilibrium approach (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989), the marginal price bid
is the best response of an electricity generating firm given the actions taken by its competitors (as it
sets its level of generation and the spot price). This optimal bid price is associated with an optimal
generation quantity, so the residual demand of the generator in the equilibrium price should be equal
to its ideal generation.
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of 10% and 25% to compute \IEMPijt.
Figure 2: IEMP Calculation technique
Source: Data from XM - Calculations and elaboration: Author.
Information about daily price bids, hourly spot prices, hourly ideal generation and
hourly sales in forward contracts — essential details to compute the IEMP — was taken
from the website of the Colombian wholesale electricity market operator XM.
A shortcoming of the IEMP calculation technique presented above is that it can yield
extreme values due to absolute values close to zero in the denominator of expression 9.
In fact, in the sample analyzed in this paper, extreme values are obtained which can
reach 2.228 times the interquartile range. Panel (a) in figure 3 presents a scatter plot
for the IEMP and the margin (P ⇤
ijt
  cjt) for the total sample in which extreme outliers
are present. In order to address this issue, the sample has been trimmed to exclude the
observations corresponding to the 1% lowest values for the denominator of expression
9, i.e., the sum of the slopes of the hourly residual demand functions. Panel b in figure
3 presents an IEMP vs. margin scatter plot, after trimming. In the robustness tests,
several trimming percentile values are tested but they have no major impact on results.
Unlike the situation with estimated costs, some di↵erences were found in the de-
scriptive statistics of the IEMP for private and public companies. Figure 4 shows the
distribution of the IEMP among the main public and private electricity generation com-
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Figure 3: Sample outliers and trimming
(a) Total sample (b) Trimmed sample
Source: Data from XM - Calculations and elaboration: Author.
panies in Colombia. Panel a in figure 4 presents the box-plot excluding extreme values.
In this figure, it can be seen that while private companies, on average, have incentives to
exercise market power through price increases, public companies have incentives to bid
prices below the marginal cost. In panels b and c in Figure 4, it can also be seen that
the distribution of IEMP among private enterprises has more weight in the right tail,
while that corresponding to public firms has more weight in the left tail. This occurs
because, on average, a greater percentage of the energy the latter sell is committed to
forward contracts.
Information about instrumental variables — including daily water inflows and hourly
commercial availability — was taken from the website of the Colombian wholesale elec-
tricity market operator XM. Table 4 highlights the main descriptive statistics for each
of the variables included in the model.
4.1 Estimation and results
Given the marginal cost estimates for each plant and each firm’s incentives to exercise
market power under the assumption of profit maximization, we can now estimate the
econometric model of expression 8 and test the hypotheses formulated in sub-section 3.2.
In this first approximation, I ignore endogeneity issues for the time being. Estimation
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Figure 4: IEMP of private and public firms
(a) Box-plot
(b) Histogram Private (c) Histogram Public
Source: Data from XM - Calculations and elaboration: Author.
of the two-way fixed e↵ects model proposed in expression 8 was performed by ordinary
least squares (OLS). Table 5 presents the results of the estimations. The specifications
presented in columns (1), (2), and (3) include monthly fixed e↵ects and generation unit
fixed e↵ects.
In the case of H1, the results in table 5 suggest that there are marked di↵erences
between private and public firms in their respective exercise of unilateral market power.
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Table 4: Variables in the econometric model
Variable and unit No.Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Marginal bid ($/KWh) 19789 119.50 61.26 27.39 999.64
Marginal cost ($/KWh) 19789 83.86 26.09 26.28 270.73
IEMP ($/KWh) 19789 -1.25 87.43 -3330.17 2024.58
River inflows of competitors (GWh) 19789 96.47 44.97 9.91 394.00
Availability of competitors (GWh) 19789 10.99 1.07 7.38 14.24
Weekend day dummy 19789 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
PRIVATE
Marginal bid ($/KWh) 10344 120.45 65.05 27.39 999.64
Marginal cost ($/KWh) 10344 87.17 24.06 31.88 265.19
IEMP ($/KWh) 10344 14.00 65.70 -663.68 2024.58
River inflows of competitors (GWh) 10344 96.70 44.01 20.84 394.00
Availability of competitors (GWh) 10344 10.98 1.18 7.43 14.24
Weekend day dummy 10344 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
PUBLIC
Marginal bid ($/KWh) 9445 118.47 56.81 27.87 721.91
Marginal cost ($/KWh) 9445 80.23 27.70 26.28 270.73
IEMP ($/KWh) 9445 -17.95 103.71 -3330.17 1311.18
River inflows of competitors (GWh) 9445 96.22 46.00 9.91 394.00
Availability of competitors (GWh) 9445 11.00 0.95 7.38 14.00
Weekend day dummy 9445 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Source: XM - Market Operator
The null hypothesis corresponding to no di↵erence in the coe cients is rejected at con-
ventional levels of statistical significance. As expected, the coe cient for private firms
is greater than that for public firms. The coe cient of the interaction of the IEMP with
the private dummy is statistically significant at conventional levels in all cases and the
magnitude of this coe cient is economically significant, positive, and greater than that
obtained for public firms.
As regards H2, no statistical evidence is found to reject the null hypothesis of no
strategic behavior being shown by public firms. These results support the hypothesis of
regulatory intervention by public firms in the Colombian electricity market.
As for H3, the results indicate that the IEMP has an impact on the pricing strategy
of private firms. Although there is statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis of
perfect profit-maximization behavior, the coe cient for private firms presents a positive
sign and is statistically and economically significant.19 According to these results, private
19I performed a conventional Wald test to verify the null hypothesis: H0 : ↵pri = 1 for private firms.
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Table 5: OLS regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private IEMP 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.19***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Public IEMP 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Marginal Cost 1.29*** -0.84** 0.83*** -0.26
(0.19) (0.39) (0.26) (0.21)
Monthly F.E. N Y N Y
Unit F.E. N N Y Y
N. Obs 19789 19789 19789 19789
N. Clusters 32 32 32 32
R-squared 0.74 0.37 0.63 0.69
Joint-Sig. 30.60*** 36.65*** 115.0*** 32.38***
Test No Di↵ 8.33 12.47 11.97 12.96
p-Value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test PMP 84.17 174.14 162.37 190.25
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5%
and * at 10%). SE clustered by unit in parentheses. Test No Di↵:
H0 : ↵pri   ↵soe = 0 and Test PMP(Profit maximization
by private firms): H0 : ↵pri = 1.
firms exercise between 19.3% and 25% of the market power predicted by theory.
In order to test the coherence of the results presented in table 5 as regards firm
heterogeneity, independent regressions of the bid price on IEMP by firm were performed
in line with McRae and Wolak (2009). Expression 8 was then estimated for the main
private and public firms. The firms analyzed account for more than 80% of the energy
generated, and in 89% of hourly periods, these same firms set the spot price. The results
of these econometric estimations are summarized in table 6 for private firms and table 7
for public firms.
Table 6 shows that the coe cients for private firms are positive and statistically
significant. Even though they di↵er for each private firm, the coe cient of the pooled
regression falls within the confidence intervals of the regressions for each private firm.
28
Table 6: OLS independent regressions by firm - Private
ENDESA COLINV EPSA
(1) (2) (3)
Private IEMP 0.18*** 0.20** 0.19**
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Marginal Cost 2.00*** -1.95 5.90***
(0.44) (1.41) (1.59)
Monthly F.E. Y Y Y
Unit F.E. Y Y Y
N.Obs 2,485 1,531 112
N. Clusters 7 6 -
R-squared 0.38 0.12 0.26
Joint-Sig. 8.839*** 2.452*** 6.818***
Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5%
and * at 10%). SE clustered by unit in parentheses.
Table 7: OLS independent regressions by firm - Public
ISAGEN EPM GECELCA GENSA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public IEMP -0.03* -0.02 -0.17*** -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Marginal Cost -0.87 -0.34 -1.67*** 0.56***
(0.78) (1.08) (0.61) (0.16)
Monthly F.E. Y Y Y Y
Unit F.E. Y Y Y Y
N.Obs 1,133 471 3,000 3,634
N. Clusters - - 6 4
R-squared 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.02
Joint-Sig. 2.174 0.455 41.49*** 14.07**
Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5%
and * at 10%). SE clustered by unit in parentheses.
In contrast, according to table 7, the coe cients for public firms are not statistically
significant and are even negative. These results support the hypotheses of behavioral
di↵erences between public and private firms and perfect regulatory intervention by public
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firms.
Sub-section 3.2 sounded a warning about potential problems of endogeneity arising
from the interaction of firms and the measurement error of the IEMP. In terms of the
elements presented in expression 8, this entails relaxing the assumption that "it is un-
correlated with the IEMP. Hence, the OLS estimates must be interpreted with caution
given this potential identification problem.
As stated, to address the issue of endogeneity of the IEMP, I used instrumental
variable techniques. I performed a two-stage generalized method of moments (GMM2S)
in order to estimate the two-way fixed e↵ects proposed in expression 8. As instruments
I used the contemporary values, the quadratic transformation, and the first three lags of
the variables described in sub-section 3.2, i.e., the inflows of the rivers feeding the rival
firms’ reservoirs, the competitors’ commercial availability, and the weekend day dummy
variable.
There are two endogenous variables: the interactions Dpri
j
\IEMPih and Dpubj \IEMPih.











































+ ✓(ccijt) +  weekday + µj + 't + ⌘it
where the owner can be either private (pri) or public (pub), z1
 it
is the sum of inflows
of the rivers which feed the reservoirs of the major hydroelectric units of the competitors
of agent i on day t measured in GWh, z2
 it
is the sum of the commercial availability of
the competitors of agent i on day t measured in GWh, ⌧ is the lag of the variables used
as instruments,  weekday is the weekend day dummy, µj represents unit fixed e↵ects, and
't are monthly fixed e↵ects. The results of these GMM2S estimations are shown in table
8. 20
20Note that column 5 of table 8 presents a specification which is a more rigorous structural interpreta-
tion of profit-maximization restricted to one bid per day from each unit. If the marginal cost and IEMP
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Table 8: Two way fixed e↵ects - GMM - results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private IEMP 0.67*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.69***
(0.23) (0.19) (0.11) (0.08)
Public IEMP -0.15* -0.37** 0.04 0.27**
(0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (0.11)
Marginal Cost 1.22*** -0.98*** 0.59*** -0.24***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06)
Monthly F.E. N Y N Y
Unit F.E. N N Y Y
N. Obs 14836 14836 14836 14836
N. Clusters 32 32 32 32
Joint Sig. 360.9*** 54.26*** 112.8*** 54.83***
Weak Identification
F first stage Private 8.83 119.00 1729.29 618.54
F first stage Public 18.02 51.90 7.06 25.73
K-P rk Wald F 18.81 6.83 21.83 2.45
Cragg-Donald Wald F 8.9 11.13 6.93 6.23
Overidentification
Hansen J 24.76 13.63 21.72 21.11
p-Value 0.17 0.81 0.3 0.33
Test No Di↵ 9.31 22.06 26.27 6.62
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test PMP 2.03 0.40 0.93 14.48
p-Value 0.15 0.53 0.34 0.02
Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%).
SE clustered by unit in parentheses. Test No Di↵:H0 : ↵pri   ↵soe = 0 and Test PMP
(Profit maximization by private firms): H0 : ↵pri = 1. The test statistics for weak
identification are the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F and the Cragg-Donald Wald F. H0:
Instruments are weak. The critical values for two endogenous variables and twenty-one
excluded instruments are 20.53, 11.04, and 6.10 for 5%, 10% and 20% maximal IV
relative bias, respectively, according to Stock and Yogo (2002)
In the case of H1, the GMM2S estimations yield qualitatively similar results to those
components are measured correctly, under a structural interpretation of the profit-maximization model,
the empirical analog of the first-order condition should not include the constant and fixed e↵ects that
do not appear in equation 2. As mentioned above, the fixed e↵ects would allow public firms violate the
marginal cost pricing rule. The orthogonality conditions of this rigorous specification can be expressed
as:
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obtained by the OLS regressions. The null hypothesis to the e↵ect that there is no
di↵erence in the coe cients of private and public firms is rejected. The coe cients
of private firms are positive, statistically significant, and greater than those of public
companies.
As for H2, di↵erent results are obtained depending on the particular model specifica-
tion. For the model that ignores individual heterogeneity, the sign of the coe cient for
public firms is negative and statistically significant. Conversely, the model that accounts
for time and unit fixed e↵ects yields a positive coe cient that is both economically and
statistically significant.
However, it should be noted that these estimates di↵er quantitatively from those
obtained by OLS. The coe cients from the GMM2S estimation yield values of a higher
order of magnitude, especially for private firms. These results are consistent with the
attenuation bias problem in the OLS estimators. Indeed, I found values that were three
to five times higher than those obtained when using the OLS estimation. In addition,
the value of these coe cients is closer to the expected theoretical value of the profit-
maximization models for private firms.
As for H3, note that the specifications including time or unit fixed e↵ects do not
allow rejection of the null hypothesis at any standard level of significance. In the case
of the two-way fixed e↵ects model, the hypothesis of profit-maximization behavior by
private firms cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level.
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Alternatively, in column 5 of table C12 in appendix C, I present the results of a model in which I
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the models satisfy the exclusion restriction. As for the potential weakness of the instru-
ments, the F-statistic for each of the endogenous regressors meets the rule-of- thumb
threshold of values higher than 10 for the models in columns (3) and (4). Moreover,
the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic suggests that the GMM2S estimations presented in
table 8 have a maximum bias, which would not be more than 10% of the bias of the
OLS estimations for the models in columns (2) and not more than 20% for the models
in columns (3) and (4), according to the criteria described by Stock and Yogo (2002).
Alternatively, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic suggests that the GMM2S esti-
mations presented in table 8 have a maximum bias, which would not be more than 5%
of the bias of the OLS estimations for the model in column (3), 20% for the model in
column (2) and more than 30% for the model presented in column (4), according to the
same criteria (Stock and Yogo, 2002). Although several of the models presented satisfy
some of the criteria for ruling out instrument weakness as a relevant issue, the results
presented in Table 8 should be interpreted with caution given that there is no clear
consensus regarding the criteria for detecting weak instruments when the conditional
homoskedasticity assumption is not valid.
In short, the results of the econometric exercises performed here suggest that pri-
vate firms in the Colombian wholesale electricity market are more responsive to their
incentives to exercise market power than are public firms. Moreover, there is empiri-
cal evidence in support of the hypothesis of regulatory intervention by the latter in the
Colombian electricity market. The introduction of structural elements in the identifica-
tion strategy reveals indications of attenuation bias in the OLS estimators and partial
evidence of profit-maximization behavior on the part of private firms in the Colom-
bian spot market. Overall, this indicates that the private ownership share of electricity
generation is not neutral as regards competition.
4.2 Robustness checks
The results presented above are dependent on particular specification decisions: (i) The
left hand side variable; (ii) the sample of units selected for the estimate and; (iii) the
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choices of di↵erent parameters in the empirical implementation. Here, several estimations
of the econometric model are run to test di↵erent specifications of these alternatives.
Overall, the qualitative results of the model seem to be relatively robust to the di↵erent
options.
(i) Specification of the hand side variable The marginal price of each generator
is chosen as the left-hand side variable of the baseline econometric model. The ad-
vantage of so doing is that it is possible to obtain a coe cient for the marginal cost
and to determine if its value and sign are consistent with expression (2). However,
it is equally possible to employ the firm’s margin as the left-hand side variable.
Thus, the margin mit = P ⇤ijt   bcijt was calculated and used as the independent
variable in the econometric model. The results are summarized in Table C12 in
appendix C. The model’s main results remain unchanged. The coe cients of the
estimates for the private IEMP lie within the original model’s confidence interval,
while the value of the coe cient for the SOEs is not statistically significant or is
very close to zero.
(ii) Sample of units Several concerns may arise regarding potential selection bias
in the sample used for the baseline estimation and the criterion for classifying units
as public or private.
As mentioned in section 2, around 70% of electricity in Colombia is produced from
hydroelectric resources, so it makes sense to assume that the profitability of the
most important companies in this market depends mainly on this type of resource.
Nonetheless, in the baseline estimation presented in sub-section 4.1, only observa-
tions in which the thermal units were marginal were included. This is problem-
atic because it is possible that determination of a thermal unit as marginal is not
random. This would imply that the data-generating process in circumstances in
which thermal plants are marginal is particular to those circumstances and does not
34
present a reliable general picture of the unilateral market power of private and pub-
lic firms in the Colombian wholesale electricity market, i.e., the baseline estimation
may be subject to a potential selection bias. In order to address this concern, I per-
formed a two-way fixed e↵ects estimation that also included the hydro units.21 The
results are summarized in Table C13 in appendix C. The model’s main conclusions
remain unchanged. In the two-way fixed e↵ects model (Column 4 in table C13)
the coe cients of the OLS estimates for the private IEMP are smaller than the
baseline estimation but positive and statistically significant, while the value of the
coe cients for the public firms is not statistically significant. Regarding the IEMP
coe cients of the GMM estimates when hydro units are included, for both public
and private firms alike, they lie within the baseline model’s confidence intervals.
Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with caution given the results of
the indicators of instrument weakness and also because the overidentification test
is close to the critical values for rejection of the null hypothesis.
Meanwhile, as mentioned in section 2, I classified the generation firms into “private”
and “public” according to the ownership category of the shareholder controlling the
firm that represents the unit to the market operator. However, it is possible that not
all public firms have the same incentives. In particular, there are two types of public
firm in the Colombian wholesale electricity market that might not be interested in
mitigating market power.22 In order to tackle this problem of potential incentive
misalignment and selection bias, I performed the estimation of the two way fixed
21The inclusion of this type of unit in the sample cannot be done at zero cost in relation to the
assumptions necessary for the validity of the estimate. First, it must be assumed that the first-order
condition in expression (2) is also true for both thermal and hydraulic units, excluding potential dynamic
components for the latter. Second, it must be assumed that the marginal cost of thermal units and the
opportunity cost of water in hydraulic units are adequately modeled by unit and time fixed e↵ects.
This robustness check is inspired in the suggestion of an anonymous referee.
22First, the firm EPM is the property of the municipality of Medelĺın. It is possible that despite being
a public company, EPM could exercise unilateral market power in the national electricity market in order
to extract additional profits from other regions and transfer these benefits to the citizens of Medelĺın.
Second, some of the thermal units represented in the market by public firms are actually owned by
private companies that have signed power purchase agreements (PPA) with these public firms. This
type of public company may have di↵erent bid price incentives depending on whether the unit being
o↵ered is subject to a PPA or not. I owe this observation to an anonymous referee.
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e↵ects model presented in section 4.1 excluding from the sample the units under
a PPA in force and the unit owned by EPM.23. The results for estimation of this
model are presented in table C14 in appendix C.
The most important qualitative results of the estimation remain unchanged. In the
two-way fixed e↵ects estimate, the coe cients of the private IEMP are lower than
those in the baseline estimation, but they have the same order of magnitude and
are economically and statistically significant. In contrast, in the GMM2S two-way
fixed e↵ects estimate, the coe cients for the IEMP of public firms are barely higher
than those in the baseline estimation. In any event, the test for no di↵erences is still
rejected at standard significance levels. It is important to note that the indicators
of model identification do not reveal evidence of instrument weakness or violation
of the exclusion restriction.
Another important aspect that must be accounted for in order to avoid selection
bias is related to the mechanism of electricity generation back-up for restricted
supply situations. Colombia’s generation supply is heavily dependent on its hy-
droelectric resources in drought periods which are exacerbated by El Niño events.
To guarantee supply during this phenomenon, Colombia has created a payment for
power availability, known as the “reliability charge”.24
In order to rule out the possibility that the results in the baseline estimation are
caused by ignoring the potential change in incentives due to the reliability charge
scheme, I performed the estimation of the two-way fixed e↵ects specification ex-
cluding from the sample the days on which the spot price rose above the scarcity
23Particularly, I excluded observations of the units Termocentro, Termovalle, Termoflores 1, Termo-
barranquilla 3, Termobarranquilla 4, Tebsa, and Paipa 4.
24This mechanism works as a call option, where the product of the option is the obligation to generate
a specific firm energy quantity. These obligations are assigned in a long-run multi-unit auction. The
reference price of the call option is the spot price of the wholesale electricity market and the strike
price is the scarcity price. The latter is defined by the regulator and is a reference of the variable cost
of generation of the most expensive unit in the system. Note that during periods when the price rises
above the scarcity price, the reliability charge imposes the production of firm energy quantities at a fixed
price, just as unilateral forward contracts do. As a result, it may be that reliability charge incentives
distort the IEMP in the spot market during critical El Niño events.
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price for at least one hour.25
The weight of observations for which the spot price exceeds the scarcity price is
modest even when only thermal units are considered. For the entire sample (in-
cluding thermal and hydraulic resources), this situation occurred in 68 observations.
For the sample of thermal units, it occurred in 53 observations. The number of
observations eliminated by discarding the days on which the marginal price ex-
ceeded the scarcity price for at least one hour was 766 for the entire sample and
422 for the sub-sample of thermal units. As can be seen in Table C15 in appendix
C, the results of the check described above were robust and similar to the baseline
estimation.
(iii) Choices of di↵erent parameters In order to implement the econometric model,
it is necessary to rely on particular choices of several parameters such as:
a. The percentage by which the sample should be trimmed in order to eliminate
the IEMP outliers;
b. The lags of the instruments in the first stage of the IV estimations; and
c. The delta ( ) parameter and the methodology for computing the incentives to
exercise market power.
First, in the baseline estimation, the sample was trimmed to exclude observations
corresponding to the 1% lowest values for the denominator of expression 9. Table
C16 in appendix C presents the estimations when trimming observations corre-
sponding to the 0.1% and 5% lowest values.
The OLS estimates of the coe cient of private IEMP yield values that lie within
the 95% confidence interval of the baseline estimation. Similarly, the OLS estimates
of the coe cient of private IEMP are not statistically significant or are very close
to zero. In the case of the GMM2S estimations, even though the coe cients of the
25This robustness arises from the observations of an anonymous referee.
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private IEMP show lower values for the sample trimmed to the 0.1% lowest values,
they are still statistically and economically significant. In the case of the IEMP of
public firms , the results remain unchanged.
Second, in the baseline estimation, the first three lags of the river inflows and the
commercial availability of competitors were used as instruments for the GMM2S
estimations. I repeated the estimations of this model using the first two and first
four lags in the instrumental variable specification. These estimations are reported
in Table C17 in appendix C, where it can be seen that they are similar to the
baseline estimation.
Finally, it is important to verify that the results of the estimates are relatively
insensitive to the computation methodology for the \IEMPijt. In the baseline es-
timation, a delta   parameter of 5% is set in order to take into account the price
window when calculating the slope of the inverse residual demand function. In
order to verify the robustness of the baseline results, the IEMP was calculated
again using   parameters of 10% and 25% and the estimations were repeated with
the same baseline econometric specification. The results are shown in table C18
in appendix C. Although the value of the private IEMP coe cient seems to in-
crease with the delta parameter, these econometric regressions indicate that the
most important qualitative results of the baseline estimation remain unchanged.
In addition, one of the potential shortcomings of the methodology for computing
the residual demand slope based on only two points along the function, as the one
used for the baseline estimate, is that the estimate of the slope is highly sensitive
to idiosyncratically steep or flat sections of the residual demand.26 In order to rule
out the possibility that this weak point may distort the final results, I applied a
smoothing approach that has been implemented by several authors (Reguant, 2014;
Wolak, 2003, 2007) in the context of electricity auctions. This approach uses all
the steps of the residual demand function to compute the slope. For a given hour
26This robustness check arises from the suggestion of an anonymous referee.
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is the marginal price of firm i in hour t, K is the number of genera-
tion units supplied by the rivals of firm i, q ikt is the quantity supplied by unit
k owned by a rival in hour t and s ikt is the bid for this unit,  (t) is the stan-
dard normal density function, and h is the smoothing parameter. I applied three
di↵erent smoothing parameters: h = 200, h = 400 and h = 800,27 and used this
calculation of the residual demand slope to compute the daily \IEMPijt, repeating
the econometric estimations. As can be seen in tables C19, C20 and C21 in ap-
pendix C the smoothing parameter methodology has a relatively minor e↵ect on
the estimates and does not invalidate the most important qualitative results of the
baseline model.
4.3 E ciency gains from market power mitigation
An important question that arises from the hypothesis of market power mitigation be-
havior by public companies is what level of e ciency gains is achieved due to public
companies ignoring the incentives to exercise market power? 28
In this paper, it has been assumed that the total demand for electricity is inelastic.
This implies that losses in consumer surplus are transferred to a larger producer surplus
and hence the deadweight losses arise from the supply side. In this context, it is possible
to identify two sources of potential e ciency gains. The first consists of the rival’s
incentive e↵ect. This arises because the supply of prices with market power mitigation by
public companies implies that private companies are faced with flatter residual demand
curves. On the other hand, it is also possible to identify a merit order e↵ect. This
27I use these parameters because the standard deviation of the bids of the units participating in the
market in the study period is around 400.
28This sub-section arises from the suggestion of an anonymous referee.
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originates from the e ciency gains that result from the displacement of higher-cost
plants owned by private companies as a consequence of public companies bidding at
competitive prices. Despite the importance of these e↵ects, the calculation of each of
these components presents several di culties.
Regarding the rival’s incentive e↵ect, once the counterfactual of a profit-maximizing
public company is added, then in order to perform a complete calculation of the compa-
nies’ response it would be necessary to calculate the new equilibrium under this counter-
factual. To perform this task, it may be necessary to assume an oligopolistic competition
model and a functional form for the marginal costs of the firms, an exercise that goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
In relation to the merit order e↵ect, it is necessary to have estimates of the marginal
costs in order to build the competitive supply of public and private firms and calculate
the generation costs both in equilibrium with market power mitigation and in the coun-
terfactual equilibrium in which the public company maximizes profits. As mentioned
above, there are estimates of the marginal costs of thermal units but not for hydro
plants. Therefore, there is no choice but to make some kind of assumption regarding
the marginal cost of the water units. In the context of this sub-section of the paper, it
will be assumed that all the firms bid the marginal costs of water units. This allows the
results of the calculations to be interpreted as a lower bound of the merit order e↵ect.
To calculate the merit order e↵ect, the following steps were adopted:
1. First, three counterfactual scenarios of privatization of a number of companies
owned by central government are constructed.
– In the first counterfactual scenario, it is assumed that the ISAGEN company
was privately owned from 2005 to 2015.
– In the second counterfactual scenario, it is assumed that the ISAGEN and
GECELCA companies formed a single synthetic firm and that this firm was
privately owned from 2005 to 2015.
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– In the third counterfactual scenario, it is assumed that the companies IS-
AGEN, GECELCA, and GENSA comprise a single synthetic firm and that
this firm was privately owned from 2005 to 2015.
2. Second, the residual demand curve and the total cost curve of the synthetic com-
pany are constructed for each hour of the day. Water resources are assumed to be
being bet at the marginal cost.
3. Third, each firm’s profits are calculated as the income obtained at each point
of residual demand minus the accumulated costs at the corresponding level of
production. To calculate the profit function, two cases arise:
– The profits that the firm would obtain if it did not have energy committed in
forward contracts.
– The profits that the firm would obtain according to the forward contracts
observed in the sample.
The prices and quantities in the residual demand that maximize profits in each
scenario and case are found. The generation quantities and costs corresponding to
the optimal solution are calculated.
4. Fourth, the competitive supply curve is constructed. The bidding prices of the
thermal units are replaced by the marginal costs for the counterfactual privatized
firm. Here it is also assumed that the bidding prices of the water units reflect their
marginal cost. Subsequently, the market power mitigation equilibrium is calculated
and the generation levels and costs corresponding to this equilibrium are computed.
5. Fifth, the generation costs in each counterfactual scenario and each case of speci-
fication of the profit function (with and without contracts) are compared with the
generation costs resulting from the market power mitigation equilibrium.
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The results of applying this methodology in scenario 1 are presented in table 9, those
corresponding to scenario 2 are presented in table 10, and those corresponding to scenario
3 are presented in table 11.
Table 9: E ciency gains of market power mitigation: scenario 1
Millions of Colombian pesos
Year Total Cost E ciency Loss E ciency Loss E ciency Loss % E ciency Loss %
MP Mitigation No Forward C. With Forward C. No Forward C. With Forward C.
2005 6515.51 97.88 5.97 1.22% 0.09%
2006 6565.00 116.66 7.10 1.46% 0.12%
2007 7666.48 91.00 2.92 0.97% 0.04%
2008 7581.96 217.56 9.31 2.42% 0.12%
2009 12535.94 91.31 9.28 0.66% 0.08%
2010 12730.86 101.32 14.33 0.92% 0.18%
2011 7385.82 114.14 10.28 1.57% 0.16%
2012 12009.47 117.35 11.83 1.39% 0.14%
2013 17456.32 124.19 7.70 0.72% 0.06%
2014 20639.42 180.26 5.50 0.88% 0.03%
Table 10: E ciency gains of market power mitigation: scenario 2
Millions of Colombian pesos
Year Total Cost E ciency Loss E ciency Loss E ciency Loss % E ciency Loss %
MP Mitigation No Forward C. With Forward C. No Forward C. With Forward C.
2005 5502.50 277.36 20.99 4.00% 0.34%
2006 6130.29 387.00 13.79 5.02% 0.20%
2007 6722.82 336.92 12.03 4.25% 0.18%
2008 6963.17 643.17 30.70 7.80% 0.36%
2009 11160.04 445.72 39.85 3.49% 0.30%
2010 11492.94 345.04 46.30 2.82% 0.34%
2011 7041.47 271.82 16.13 3.35% 0.17%
2012 11150.43 243.47 9.10 2.20% 0.08%
2013 15842.11 575.75 21.48 3.40% 0.16%
2014 18720.37 672.93 34.98 3.67% 0.18%
In the case in which the counterfactual company does not have energy committed in
contracts, the impact in the first scenario (ISAGEN private) varies between 0.66% and
2.42% of the cost of a non-privatization situation, an e↵ect that seems quite modest if
we consider that ISAGEN is among the three most important firms in the electricity
generation market in Colombia. The explanation for this is that the ISAGEN company
only has one thermal unit (Termocentro) and the model presented above only captures
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Table 11: E ciency gains of market power mitigation: scenario 3
Millions of Colombian pesos
Year Total Cost E ciency Loss E ciency Loss E ciency Loss % E ciency Loss %
MP Mitigation No Forward C. With Forward C. No Forward C. With Forward C.
2005 5502.50 277.36 20.99 4.00% 0.34%
2006 6147.04 492.22 14.20 6.40% 0.17%
2007 6668.42 435.08 18.38 5.49% 0.23%
2008 6952.99 781.66 23.66 9.53% 0.29%
2009 11182.01 611.68 50.57 4.81% 0.30%
2010 11567.71 455.06 56.75 3.62% 0.34%
2011 7109.33 333.13 22.37 4.03% 0.21%
2012 11171.03 302.33 8.91 2.61% 0.06%
2013 15887.09 790.21 25.29 4.62% 0.15%
2014 18609.15 846.85 77.10 4.75% 0.33%
the e↵ect of the merit order of thermal units. In the second (GECELA and ISAGEN
private) and third scenarios (GECELA, GECELCA, and GENSA private), more impor-
tant e↵ects are observed that vary between 2.82% and 7.82% for the second case and
2.61% and 9.52% for the third.
This variation seems to be explained to some extent by fluctuations in water resources
caused by El Niño and La Niña phenomena. In 2011, significantly lower generation costs
were observed, which coincided with the abundance of water resources generated by a
fairly intense La Niña phenomenon. On the other hand, higher generation costs were
observed in 2014. One explanation for this may be that November and December of this
year witnessed the start of the worst El Niño phenomenon observed in a decade.
In the case in which the counterfactual company has energy committed in forward
contracts according to the quantities observed in the sample, the e ciency gains by the
merit order e↵ect in the three scenarios considered is negligible. In the first it varies
from 0.03% to 0.18%, in the second from 0.08% to 0.36%, and in the third from 0.06%
to 0.34%.
As in the previous case, this result can be partially explained by the fact that the
proposed methodology only captures the merit order e↵ect of thermal units. However,
the di↵erence in results between the first and second cases shows that levels of forward
contracts play a determining role in the possibilities of mitigating market power in the
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spot electricity market.
As mentioned above, it is possible that a company that intends to mitigate market
power applies this policy in deciding its forward contractual positions, thus conditioning
how much potential market power it has in the short-term market. In the case that
considers the observed forward contracts levels, the results suggest that given the for-
ward contracting position of public firms, there are no major di↵erences between the
equilibrium that would be obtained from profit maximization and application of the
marginal cost pricing rule. This can happen because public companies have signed con-
tracts in such a way that they have little incentive to exercise market power in the spot
market. Of course, this interpretation is based on the strong assumption that the firms
used to construct the counterfactual scenario bid their water resources according to their
marginal costs.
In my opinion, given that the evidence presented in sub-section 4.3 suggests that
public companies exert market power mitigation in the short-term market, it is quite
possible that these same companies are also exerting such mitigation in the forward
contract market. This leads me to consider that the e ciency gains from market power
mitigation behavior in the Colombian spot electricity generation market are modest.
5 Conclusions
In this study, bid price information for the Colombian electricity market has been used
to understand di↵erences in the way in which private and public firms exercise market
power. Here, the methodology developed by McRae and Wolak (2009) has been extended
to include firms that do not price strategically. A new interpretation is proposed of the
impact of incentives to exercise market power on prices in an attempt to obtain evidence
of the profit-maximizing behavior of private firms and the adoption of the marginal cost
pricing rule by public firms.
Estimations of the semi-elasticity of demand combined with contracting information
suggest that the generators analyzed — both state-owned and private — had incentives
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to exercise market power in association with profit-maximization behavior. An econo-
metric analysis was conducted to find statistical evidence of: i) di↵erences in the impact
of incentives to exercise market power on the bids and prices of state-owned and private
firms; ii) the non-exercise of market power by public companies in accordance with the
marginal cost pricing rule; and iii) the exercise of market power by private firms con-
sistent with profit-maximization behavior. Based on the outcomes of these econometric
estimations, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, marked di↵erences exist in the
way in which private and state-owned firms exercise unilateral market power: Specifi-
cally, private generators in the Colombian market are more responsive to IEMP than
are public firms. Second, public firms exercise regulatory intervention in the Colombian
electricity markets - that is, they are not responsive to IEMP.
These findings suggest that the ownership regime of firms in Colombia’s electricity
industry is not neutral as regards the exercise of market power. Moreover, the outcomes
reported have important implications for the regulation of electricity markets and the
privatization of state-owned firms. First, besides increasing competition, there would
appear to be an alternative way to achieve e ciency, namely, the mitigation of market
power by state-owned companies. Likewise, regulators need to recognize the nature of
ownership within the market they are designing and determine whether public companies
implement market power mitigation strategies. Second, the absence of neutrality in
the exercise of market power implies that privatization has indirect e↵ects on market
competitiveness. This means the government should take into account the possible anti-
competitive e↵ects that privatization might have and include these undesirable costs in
their assessment of the sales operation of state-owned generation units.
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Appendix A Derivation of the daily version of the
IEMP
The problem the generator faces is that of designing a set of daily bids Sit = {si1t, si2t, · · · , sijt,
· · · , siNt}, where sijt is the daily bid price on day t for the energy of unit j, owned by
firm i and N is the number of units that this firm i is able to bid. These bids are ordered
from lowest to highest, so that they maximize the expected daily profit ⇡it, which is the
sum of the hourly profits ⇡ith. If we adopt a residual demand approach, in which the
competitors’ bids are given, the generator should choose the bids that clear the market
in the 24 hours of day t, constrained by the capacity of its own units and the market
clearing price rules. Let ⇡it(Sit) be the daily profits of firm i on day t ; let DRith be the
residual demand of firm i on day t at hour h; and, let Sit be the set of bids made by firm
i during day t. When considering forward contracts, the profit maximization problem of


































Subject to capacity constraints and non-negativity conditions:29
0  qjith  qji
If the restrictions are not binding,30 the first order conditions of this problem are:
29In the equilibrium the residual demand of firm i is equal to the total production of electricity of
firm i, DRith(sjith) =
Pm
j=1 qjith, where the units 1 to m are the units that produce electricity, i.e., the
units 1 to m have bids lower or equal to the marginal price and the units (m+1) to N have bids higher
than the marginal cost, hence, the former are called to produce electricity while the latter not. That is
the way by which qijth is implicitly included in the objective function.
30Note that I am interested in the units that are marginal (the equilibrium bid of the firm). We have
to assume that around the equilibrium there are not capacity constraints. This is not reasonable when
































Given the residual demand approach and the market clearing price rule, the equi-
librium price of the market (or marginal price) is pth = min(si1t, si2t, · · · , sijt, · · · , siNt)






where the marginal unit is the m-th most expensive unit owned by firm i. Once
the units of firm i are ordered by merit, the above condition means that the spot price
is equal to the bid of the generator’s marginal unit, pth = simt, if plant m clears the
market in hour h. This in turn implies that @pth
@simt
= 1. In addition, in line with previous
studies in the literature (Reguant, 2014), I assume that the residual demand of hour t
is a function of the bid of unit m that is marginal in this hour h, but not of the bids of
the other units. This implies that the derivative of the residual demand of hour h with
respect to the bids of the plants that are not marginal in that hour is equal to zero, i.e
@DRith(simt)
@sijt
= 0 where m 6= j and that the derivative of the price of hour h with respect
to the bids of the plants that are not marginal in that hour is equal to zero i.e., @pth
@sijt
= 0,
if unit j is not marginal.
Note that the set of potential bids that the generator is able to bet is limited by
the daily bid constraint. If the day has 24 periods with di↵erent residual demands, the
generator owns N units, and N < 24, then in at least 24   N periods the generator
this is the percentage of observations in which the firms are operating at full capacity. In the sample
considering only marginal thermal units, in about 3.5% of the observations the firm is operating at full
capacity. After repeating the econometric estimations excluding these observations from the sample,
the basic results of the baseline estimation hold.
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will not be able to choose the exact bid that clears the market in the profit-maximizing
point of each hour. In fact, the generator is compelled to clear the market with the bid
of one unit, let simt, for several hours of the day. Hence, if unit m is marginal in hours
h and h+k, this means that pth = pt(h+k). In this way, every hour can be linked to a
marginal plant m. Considering all of the above, if Hijt is defined as the set of hours of
day t where unit j is marginal (and unit j is owned by firm i), the first order condition



















The optimal bids for unit j s⇤
ijt



















If we assume the marginal cost of unit j to be constant during day t, the optimal bid















Appendix B Details of the marginal cost calculus for
thermal units
The marginal costs of thermal plants were computed based on the heat rate, fuel costs,
and fuel transportation costs according to the following formula:





Heat R.i| {z }
MBTU
KWh








Where COP are Colombian pesos, MBTU are one thousand British thermal unit,
US are United States dollars, and KWh is one kilowatt per hour. The heat rate is a
measure of the thermal e ciency of the generation unit. It represents the quantity of fuel
measured in MBTU necessary to generate one kilowatt per hour. The parameters of the
heat rate of thermal electricity generation units were extracted from reports published
the Mines and Energy Planning Unit (UPME).
In the case of gas-fired units, the fuel cost is based on the price of gas from the Guajira
Basin, which is the most important gas supply source for Colombian thermal generation.
From September 1995 to August 2013, the Colombian Government regulated the price of
gas obtained from this source by imposing a maximum sale price for gas. This maximum
price at period t, pt, is given by the formula pt 1[indext 1/indext 2] where indext 1 is
the average of the last semester of the New York Harbor Residual Fuel Oil 1.0 % Sulfur
LP Spot Price according to the series that was published by the US Energy Information
Administration. A period t is defined as a semester and it changes on the 1st February
and 1st August of each year.31 This price is given in US dollars/MBTU.
From 2005 to 2013, I applied the Guajira regulated price calculation published by
the most important gas producer in the market (ECOPETROL) and converted the
resulting price (US dollars/MBTU) to Colombian pesos/KWh. The exchange rate data
was obtained from the Colombian Central Bank (Banco de la República). For the years
after 2013, the weighted average gas price was calculated according to type of contract,
based on information about wholesale gas transactions listed on the web page of the Gas
Market Operator in Colombia (BEC).
Consequently, for gas-fired units, transportation costs were calculated as the sum of
the fees for use of each segment of the gas transmission network necessary to transport
the gas from the Guajira well to the respective generation units. These fees are regulated
by the CREG and are published in regulatory acts (CREG 70 and 125 of 2003).
As regards coal-fired units, given that Colombia is a net exporter of coal, I used
the FOB export price of thermal coal available in the Colombian Mines and Energy
31The formula was established in Act 119/2005 of CREG.
53
Planning Unit (UPME) databases. The price in dollars per ton was converted into
dollars per MBTU units, multiplying by a calorific value of Colombian thermal coal
of 1,370 btu per pound (source: regulation 2009 180507 Colombian Ministry of Energy
and Mines). To compute coal transportation costs, I used an import parity approach.
According to this criterion, transportation costs are estimated as the fee in COP per ton
for road freight transportation from the closest importation port to the location of the
generation unit. These fees were extracted from information provided by the Columbian








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C17: GMM2s estimation with 2 and 4 lags
2 First Lags 4 First Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private IEMP 0.57** 0.66*** 0.68*** 0.65***
(0.24) (0.10) (0.16) (0.04)
Public IEMP 0.10 0.30* -0.44*** 0.13***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.06) (0.05)
Marginal Cost 1.26*** -0.22** 1.11*** -0.37***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02)
Monthly F.E. NO YES NO YES
Unit F.E. NO YES NO YES
N. Obs 16404 16404 13420 13420
N. Clusters 32 32 32 32
Joint Sig. 250.7*** 35.97*** 1959*** 393.3***
Weak Identification
F first stage Private 7.44 233.39 122.14 3093.21
F first stage Public 2.42 42.01 262.88 11.81
K-P rk Wald F 3.811 2.601 118.3 6.030
Cragg-Donald Wald F 11.30 7.111 7.750 5.334
Overidentification
Hansen J 22.95 18.80 28.85 24.41
p-Value 0.0852 0.223 0.185 0.381
Test No Di↵ 2.38 2.37 46.74 46.57
p-Value 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.00
Test PMP 3.07 11.58 4.34 60.56
p-Value 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.00
Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%).
SE clustered by unit in parentheses. Test No Di↵:H0 : ↵pri   ↵soe = 0 and Test PMP
(Profit maximization by private firms): H0 : ↵pri = 1. The test statistics for weak
identification are the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F and the Cragg-Donald Wald F. H0:
Instruments are weak. The critical values for two endogenous variables and twenty one
excluded instruments are 20.53, 11.04, and 6.10 for 5%, 10%, and 20% maximal IV














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table D23: Details of firms, units, and classification
FIRM/Unit Ownership Obs Percent Technology FIRM/Unit Ownership Obs Percent Technology
BETANIA S.A. PRIVATE 691 1.00% La Junca 63 0.09% Small
Betania 621 0.90% Hydro Cartagena 1 35 0.05% Thermal
Santa Ana 70 0.10% Small Cartagena 3 35 0.05% Thermal
La Tinta 29 0.04% Small
CHEC S.A. PUBLIC 8851 12.83% Santa Ana 20 0.03% Small
San Francisco 3388 4.91% Small Sueva 2 18 0.03% Small
Esmeralda 3262 4.73% Small El Limonar 13 0.02% Small
Insula 769 1.11% Small Dario Valencia 7 0.01% Small
Termodorada 1 518 0.75% Thermal
San Cancio 251 0.36% Small EPM PUBLIC 9302 13.49%
Municipal 243 0.35% Small Guatron 2443 3.54% Hydro
Intermedia 237 0.34% Small Porce Ii 1724 2.50% Hydro
Guacaica 183 0.27% Small Playas 1463 2.12% Hydro
Guatape 1184 1.72% Hydro
AES CHIVOR PRIVATE 2948 4.27% La Tasajera 815 1.18% Hydro
Chivor 2948 4.27% Hydro Porce Iii 707 1.02% Hydro
Termosierrab 501 0.73% Thermal
CELSIA S.A PRIVATE 5820 8.44% Riogrande I 237 0.34% Small
Alban 1274 1.85% Hydro La Herradura 113 0.16% Small
Rio Piedras 992 1.44% Small Ayura 78 0.11% Small
Prado 669 0.97% Hydro Niquia 23 0.03% Small
Flores 4B 523 0.76% Small Jepirachi 1 - 15 5 0.01% Small
Flores 1 431 0.62% Thermal La Vuelta 4 0.01% Small
Calima 428 0.62% Hydro Sonson 4 0.01% Small
Salvajina 317 0.46% Hydro Dolores 1 0.00% Small
Mayaguez 1 299 0.43% Small
Montanitas 238 0.35% Small EPSA S.A. PRIVATE 3547 5.14%
Merilectrica 1 221 0.32% Thermal Alban 1323 1.92% Hydro
Flores 3 157 0.23% Thermal Incauca 1 739 1.07% Small
Flores 2 138 0.20% Thermal Nima 510 0.74% Small
Termovalle 1 107 0.16% Small Calima 312 0.45% Hydro
Ingenio Providencia 2 10 0.01% Small Prado 274 0.40% Hydro
Prado Iv 6 0.01% Small Prado IV 168 0.24% Small
Alto Tulua 4 0.01% Small Termovalle 1 113 0.16% Small
Amaime 4 0.01% Small Salvajina 84 0.12% Hydro
Central Castilla 1 1 0.00% Small Central Castilla 1 12 0.02% Small
Nima 1 0.00% Small Rio Cali 9 0.01% Small
Ingenio Providencia 2 0.00% Small
CORELCA S.A. PUBLIC 434 0.63% Ingenio Riopaila 1 1 0.00% Small
Tebsab 267 0.39% Thermal
Flores 1 140 0.20% Thermal GENERADORA PUBLIC 2169 3.14%
Guajira 1 18 0.03% Thermal DEL TOLIMA S.A.
Barranquilla 3 6 0.01% Thermal Prado 741 1.07% Hydro
Guajira 2 3 0.00% Thermal Prado Iv 694 1.01% Small
Mirolindo 244 0.35% Small
EBSA S.A. PUBLIC 315 0.46% Ventana A 221 0.32% Small
Paipa 4 203 0.29% Thermal Ventana B 174 0.25% Small
Paipa 2 46 0.07% Thermal Pastales 52 0.08% Small
Paipa 1 38 0.06% Thermal Rio Recio 43 0.06% Small
Paipa 3 28 0.04% Thermal
GECELCA S.A. PUBLIC 3119 4.52%
EMGESA S.A. PRIVATE 8778 12.73% Tebsab 1437 2.08% Thermal
Guavio 2739 3.97% Hydro Guajira 2 694 1.01% Thermal
Pagua 2121 3.07% Hydro Guajira 1 596 0.86% Thermal
Betania 896 1.30% Hydro Barranquilla 4 152 0.22% Thermal
Zipaemg 4 687 1.00% Thermal Flores 1 151 0.22% Thermal
Zipaemg 2 639 0.93% Thermal Barranquilla 3 89 0.13% Thermal
Zipaemg 3 523 0.76% Thermal
Zipaemg 5 518 0.75% Thermal GENSA S.A. PUBLIC 3707 5.37%
Tequendama 126 0.18% Small Paipa 4 1390 2.02% Thermal
Charquito 112 0.16% Small Paipa 2 903 1.31% Thermal
San Antonio 102 0.15% Small Paipa 3 735 1.07% Thermal
Cartagena 2 95 0.14% Thermal Paipa 1 677 0.98% Thermal
Prado 2 0.00% Hydro
67
Continuation Table D23: Details of firms, units, and classification
FIRM/Unit Ownership Obs Percent Technology
ISAGEN S.A. PUBLIC 7664 11.11%
San Carlos 3110 4.51% Hydro
Miel I 1632 2.37% Hydro
Jaguas 1369 1.98% Hydro
Termocentro Cc 1160 1.68% Thermal
Calderas 325 0.47% Small
Amoya 57 0.08% Small
Sogamoso 6 0.01% Hydro
Amoya La Esperanza 5 0.01% Small
MERILECTRICA S.A. PRIVATE 15 0.02%
Merilectrica 1 15 0.02% Thermal
PROELECTRICA S.A.S PRIVATE 1093 1.58%
Proelectrica 1 553 0.80% Thermal
Proelectrica 2 540 0.78% Thermal
TERMOCANDELARIA PRIVATE 250 0.36%
Termocandelaria 2 157 0.23% Thermal
Termocandelaria 1 93 0.13% Thermal
TERMOEMCALI I S.A. PRIVATE 125 0.18%
Termoemcali 1 125 0.18% Thermal
PRIME TERMOFLORES PRIVATE 100 0.14%
Flores 2 53 0.08% Thermal
Flores 3 47 0.07% Thermal
TERMOTASAJERO S.A. PRIVATE 2254 3.27%
Tasajero 1 2254 3.27% Thermal
TERMOYOPAL S.A.S PRIVATE 5319 7.71%
Cimarron 2477 3.59% Small
El Morro 1 976 1.41% Small
El Morro 2 893 1.29% Small
Termoyopal 1 627 0.91% Small
Termoyopal 2 346 0.50% Thermal
URRA S.A. PUBLIC 2479 3.59%
Urra 2479 3.59% Hydro
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